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ABSTRACT 
One of the important determinants of fertility is the value of children as 
perceived by parents. This paper estimates gender and age specific value of 
children using a dynamic programming model. The underlying hypothesis is that 
the observed fertility outcomes for any couple are the solutions to their life 
cycle optimization problem. Findings from Korean data indicate that, compared 
to daughters, sons impose higher costs at young ages but yields greater 
benefits at mature ages. Both the early costs and later benefits increase 
with parental education. Also, using the estimated parameters, simulations 
are performed to show the effect of the screening test of fetal gender on 
fertility, gender-specific abortion and the sex ratio. 
1. Introduction 
The value (costs and benefits) of children is one of the important determi­
nants of parental fertility behavior and related household decisions, such as 
women's labor force participation. The value is expected to depend upon the 
child's age, sex, birth order, parental characteristics (such as, age of 
parents), household income, and socio-economic environment. However, the 
researchers face a number of questions during investigation of this issue, 
such as, what is the value of children to parents? and how is it measured? 
The value of children may be economic or non-economic in nature. How can one 
evaluate non-economic costs and benefits relative to economic ones? The true 
value of children can only be obtained after a proper aggregation of these two 
different types of value. 
A few previous studies on value of children were from anthropological 
and demographic perspectives (see, for example, Caldwell, 1982 and 1983), or 
they were based on qualitative and attitudinal survey data. 1 There are also 
some time-use studies and a few studies which attempt to compute the direct 
economic costs and benefits of children. 2 However, there is little consensus 
on the net value of children even in terms of direct economic costs and 
benefits. A most agreed upon conclusion may be that children's most signifi­
cant economic contributions might be old age support and insurance against 
extreme adversity, especially in societies where other forms of insurance or 
1See Arnold et. al. (1975), Bulatao (1981), Fawcett (1983), and Arnold and 
Kuo (1984), and Vlassoff (1990). 
2See Mueller(l976), Cain (1977, 1981), Nag et al. (1978) and Lindert (1980) 
for developing countries and Lindert (1978), Espenshade (1984) and Robinson 
(1985) for U.S. 
1 
alternative investment opportunities are not available. 
This paper does not measure the value of children qualitatively or by 
time-use, nor through direct economic costs and benefits. Instead, this 
analysis estimates gender-age specific value of children from observed 
fertility outcomes using a dynamic programming model. 
Fertility decision-making can be viewed as stochastic dynamic control 
problems where the outcomes take integer values. 3 Uncertainty exists in many 
biological and socio-economic aspects, such as, fecundability, mortality, 
child's gender prior to birth, and children's as well as own financial condi­
tions in future. Essentially, fertility decisions involve not only the number 
but also the timing and spacing of children. Consider that parents' primary 
concern is to secure old age support, which can be accomplished only by 
transfers from sons. Parents without a son are likely to put more efforts 
into having another child, other things being the same. Furthermore, parents 
would try to time their childbearing so that the period of transfers from 
children coincide with own old age, a definite phase of low income. The 
dynamic model employed in this p~per integrates the overlapping children's, 
and parent's life cycles. 
Recently, there has been a growing literature on this issue. Heckman 
and Willis (1976) developed a pioneering stochastic dynamic model of fertility 
in which parents choose a monthly conception probability in a discrete time 
framework. A study by Wolpin (1984) developed a pioneering work of an 
estimable stochastic dynamic model. In particular, he addresses the dynamic 
implications of the uncertain child mortality on fertility. Hotz and Miller 
3See Heckman and Willis (1976), Wolpin (1984), Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1985), Newman (1988), Montgomery (1988), Hotz and Miller (1988), and David and 
Mroz (1989). 
2 
(1988) examine fertility and female labor supply over the life cycle in a 
simultaneous decision framework. They show, using U.S. data, that the 
material costs of children do not vary much with age while the time costs 
decrease with child's age. 
Rust (1987,1989) developed an estimation framework of a structural 
dynamic model which is derived directly from the optimization problem. 
Applying Rust's dynamic algorithm, Montgomery (1988) estimated a structural 
dynamic model of contraceptive use. Montgomery focused on imperfect fertility 
control, and a revealed-preference estimation of desired family sizes. 
This paper builds on Wolpin (1984) and Hotz and Miller (1988), and 
adopts Rust's (1989) framework to estimations. While previous researches have 
used dynamic models to explain the number of children ever born, desired 
probability of a birth, or the effect of mortality on fertility, this research 
focuses on estimating the costs and benefits of children. By estimating the 
relative costs (and benefits) of boys to girls by age, it attempts to uncover 
the causes, types, and the extent of parental gender preferences of children 
and their effect on fertility. Furthermore, using the estimated parameters, 
it shows the impact of the medical determination of fetal gender on fertility 
and sex ratio. 
The subsequent exercise uses Korean data to estimate the value of 
children, which indicate that, compared to daughters, sons impose higher costs 
at young ages but yield greater benefits at mature ages. The early costs and 
later benefits increase with parental education. Furthermore, simulations in 
this research suggest that, given the estimated age-sex specific value of 
children, a decrease in the costs of screening test will drastically increase 
the male birth ratio, which is supported by evidence from Korean vital 
3 
statistics (National Bureau of Statistica, Korea, 1990). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a 
dynamic model of household fertility choice and the estimation strategy. The 
data is discussed in section 3. The estimation results and the sensitivity 
test of the model are in section 4. In the following section, the effects of 
the screening test of fetal gender on fertility pattern and sex ratios are 
simulated using the parameter estimates from the section 4. The last section 
summarizes the findings and discusses possible extensions. 
2. A stochastic Dynamic Model of Fertility 
A couple's lifetime after marriage is divided into a series of periods. 
Denote t=l as the first fertile period, r the last fertile period, and T the 
last living period. The couple's problem is to choose a contraceptive method 
(or a combination of multiple methods) and the extent of its use at each 
fertile period to maximize lifetime utility (utility is accrued only while one 
is alive) under a budget and a biological constraint. 
For analytical simplicity the model contains several assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that there is no savings or dissavings. 4 It is further 
assumed that the costs and benefits of children can be evaluated as money 
equivalents, that is, children and consumption are perfect substitutes. Under 
these assumptions, one of the primary reasons of having children is that they 
will provide parents with consumption (support) when the parents' income is 
reduced or eliminated. 
4The inclusion of capital market in the model will make the model too 
complicated to be estimable. 
4 
Second, it is assumed that there is no uncertainty in own (T) mortality, 
the onset of sterility (r), lifetime income schedule, and perceived child 
value schedule. These assumptions are made to keep the model empirically 
tractable. Furthermore, it is assumed that children always survive their 
parents. 5 This simplifies the model by eliminating stochastic variations 
regarding child mortality. 6 
Third, parents can control their childbearing perfectly without incur­
ring any costs. The extension to the imperfect control regime is theoretical­
ly straightforward, but it involves major complications empirically. 7 
Finally, the decision on the timing of marriage and marital dissolution 
as a consideration of fertility choice is not included in the model. Similar­
ly, the simultaneous feature of other household decisions made along with 
fertility, such as labor force participation and expenditures on children, is 
not considered in this paper. 8 
2-1. Parental Optimization Problem 
5This assumption is less problematic in countries where the infant mortality 
rate is low. 
6The model would be significantly more complicated to estimate if any of T, 
r, or child mortality were treated as a random variable. 
7This is particularly true if data are not available on the use of 
contraceptive use since the choice is not observed. Even when the choices of 
contraceptive method (for the entire previous fertile periods) are observed, it 
still is difficult to apply to estimation. The reason is because the choice set 
includes all the available contraceptive methods and the implied size of the 
state space exceeds easily the practical limit. For example, Montgomery (1988) 
used four choices of contraceptive method and Hotz and Miller (1988) estimate two 
levels of conception probability. 
8Moffitt (1984), Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) and Hotz and Miller (1988) 
discuss models which feature a simultaneous decision-making of fertility and 
labor force participation. See Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973) for the 
discussion of the interaction between quality and quantity of children, and 
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982, 1986) for a model of the differential 
expenditure on children according to gender. 
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The couple's utility function is assumed to be intertemporally additive, of 
identical form at all periods, and characterized by a constant rate of time 
preference. The control variable dt takes the value of either O (not to have 
a child) or 1 (to have a child) at each t for t=l, ... ,T. The couple's utility 
depends only on own consumption. The amount of consumption at period tis the 
income at t plus the money-equivalent value of children9 during the period. 
The value of a k-period old boy (girl) at time tis denoted as mkt(fkt), which 
may be either positive or negative. It is assumed to depend on the child's 
age and gender. 10 It is also assumed that the couple may have at most one 
child per period. 
At time t, the couple's problem is to maximize 
Et L
T 
ok-t U(xk) (1) 
k=t 
where Et is an expectation operator at time t, o a discount factor, U a 
utility function, and the consumption amount of a composite good xis 
t-1 
Xt, = Yt + L (bk+lm;_k-1 + gk+lf;_k-1) (2) 
k=O 
where Yt denotes the couple's income at t, and bt(gt) takes a value of one if 
the couple has a male (female) birth at t and zero otherwise. 
The state facing a couple at any time is determined by the choices made 
9It should be viewed as including noneconomic values (or disvalues) 
converted to monetary terms as well as economic ones. However, I abstract from 
the issue of aggregating different types of values. 
10Later, I estimate the model separately according to the parent's 
socio-economic status, and therefore allow the net value of children vary 
according to parental socioeconomic status. However, I do not allow the 
variation by the age of parents, birth order of children, or calendar time. 
Espenshade (1984) shows that there is a large variation in expenditure on 
children depending on the parent's status. 
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during the previous periods and their outcomes. Let~ denote the probability 
of any birth to be a male child. When dt is chosen at period t, the state 
facing the couple is a new-born boy with a probability of ~dt, a new-born girl 
with a probability of (1-~)dt, and no birth with a probability of 1-dt, in 
addition to the existing children at the beginning of the period. 
The optimal choices for the entire fertile life cycle can be determined 
by the method of backwards recursion. Let b(t) represent {bk}k=lt-l the se­
quence of a male birth event up to t-1 and g(t) for the female birth event. 
Thus, b(t) and g(t) represent the state faced by a couple at the start of 
period t. 
(3)s(t) = { s 1 , s 2 , ... ,st-l} for s = b, g 
Similarly, let m(t) and f(t) represent vectors of age-specific values of boys 
and girls as perceived by parents at t. 
= { ct ct ct } for = (4)c(t) t-1 • t-2 • • • • • 1 c m, f 
Therefore, the vector multiplication, b(t)m(t), denotes the net value of 
existing boys at time t, and g(t)f(t) for girls. 
The post-childbearing value function is defined as discounted expected 
utility during the sterile periods (r+l, ... T), and is written as 
V.,-+1 (b(r+l), g(r+l)) = L
T 
c5k-.,--1 (Yk + b(r+l)m(k) + g(r+l)f(k)) (S) 
k=.,-+1 
At the last fertile period (r), given the income and child's value 
schedule for the current and future periods {Yt, m(t), f(t) }t=.,.t=T, the dis­
counted expected utility if d.,. is chosen is as in equation 6. 
Define the value function at the period r as in equation 7. 
It can be shown that a unique solution to the above equation exists, and the 
7 
EUt = d.,.[7rU(Y.,. + b(T)m('T') + g(T)f('T') + mo) 
+ ( 1-11")U (y.,. + b ( 1')m(,,.) + g (,,.) f (,,.) + £0) (6)
+ 7rV.,.+1(b(1'), g(T), b.,.=l) + (l-7r)V.,.+1(b(1'), g(T), g.,.=l)] 
+ (1-d.,.) [U(Y.,. + b(T)m(T) + g(T)f(T)) 
+ v.,.+1 Cb(,,.), g(,,.))l 
V.,. ( b (,,.) , g (,,.) ) = max EU.,. ( d.,. I b (,,.) , g (,,.) ) (7)
d.,.={O,ll 
optimal choice is determined for each possible state at 1'. Now, going one 
period backwards, we solve the problem for the second to last fertile period. 
Likewise, by a successive recursion, we can solve for the couple's state 
contingent optimal fertility problem over their entire fertile periods. 
2-2. Statistical Model 
A couple decides on childbearing sequentially at each fertile period under the 
uncertainties in the sex of unborn children. For researchers, an additional 
stochastic element exists in the unobserved error terms of the utility 
function, et. Thus the single period utility associated with decision dt at 
period t given (b(t),g(t),et) is 
(8) 
The unobserved term et is assumed to be choice specific and additive to the 
systematic part of utility. The value of et(dt) can be interpreted as an 
unobserved transitory utility costs of choosing dt. Given the stochastic 
evolution of the state embodied by the transition probability and the choices 
made, the couple chooses a sequence of decision rules {dt} to maximize the 
discounted expected utility over their lifetime. The decision rule is 
determined from Bellman's equation 
Note that the expectation in the last term is respect to both the randomness 
8 
in the sex of the child(~) and the distribution of et. 
If et are identically and independently distributed bivariate extreme 
value errors, the probability of choice dt follows binary logit formula. 
Pr (dt I b(t), g(t)) = 
exp [U(dt I b(t),g(t)) + oEVt+1<dt I b(t),g(t))] (10) 
Y' exp [U(dt I (b(t),g(t)) + oEVt+1<dt I b(t),g(t))] 
dt~,ll 
The sample likelihood then is 
I 'Ti 
:£ :£ Pr(d; I b 1 (t), g 1 (t)) (11) 
isl t=s1 
where I is the number of women in the sample, and si and ri are the age at 
marriage and the age at the survey of woman i. Using an iterative method we 
can obtain consistent estimates which maximize the sample likelihood. 
2-3. Empirical Specifications 
The costs and benefits of children are assumed to depend on sex and age, but 
not on the birth order or age of parents. 11 However, by estimating the model 
separately for each subgroup, the model allows the value of children to vary 
according to parent's socio-economic status. The subgroups are formed 
according to the woman's age at survey, age at marriage, education level and 
labor force participation status. For the purpose of estimation it is assumed 
that the net monthly value of children are constant in four age groups for 
each sex: age Oto 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, and 31 to 50. 12 The estimates 
should be interpreted as money equivalents of an average monthly net value of 
11However, the utility value of children even of the same sex and age could 
differ according to parental ages due to the different income levels. 
12A specification which divides the child's age more finely would be 
desirable to obtain more accurate estimates, but it complicates the computation 
beyond the limit. The finer specification is assigned for future work. 
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a child during the interval. The utility function is assumed to take a 
logarithmic form, 13 and the discount factor per period is assumed to be 
0.95. 14 The objective function then is 
T 
Et LO. 95k-t Log(xk) (12) 
k=t 
where xis defined as previously. 
Since the dynamic problem proposed in this paper (as in most other 
discrete choice dynamic models) can only be solved numerically by backwards 
induction method, the estimation involves a burdensome computation. For 
computational tractability, a seven decision-period model is used here. Seven 
periods with two years of duration per period give 14 fertile years after 
marriage. 
The model is identified by the variations in income profile, the sex and 
age composition of children at each period, and the non-linearity embedded in 
the utility function and the multi-period structure of the model. 
3. Data 
The data are drawn from a two percent subsample of 1980 Korean Population and 
Housing Census which was conducted by National Bureau of Statistics (Korea). 
The Census is organized as a household survey. The observation for each 
13A logarithmic form of utility function emphasizes risk aversion of parents 
and the gains from a balanced consumption intertemporally. 
14The attempt to estimate the discount rate has failed. However, other 
values of discount rates (e.g. 0. 9 and 1. 0) gave qualitatively similar estimation 
results. 
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household member is given in the order of household head, spouse, children and 
others. My working sample includes once and currently married woman. We 
observe the couple's age, age at marriage, education level, place of resi­
dence, work status, occupation, and children's age and sex. 
A woman's life after marriage is divided into two year periods among 
which first seven periods (14 years) are assumed to be fertile. 15 Only a few 
cases were detected in which a woman had a birth later than the decision 
periods under the seven-period framework. In those cases a birth is moved to 
the last fertile period in which there is no birth. The couple is assumed to 
live 50 years after the marriage. 
Unfortunately, the Census did not gather information on wages or income. 
The husband's income profile is constructed by matching his age and occupation 
to the average monthly wage for the same age and occupation reported in the 
Monthly Wage Survey (1980, Department of Labor, Republic of Korea). The 
income is assumed to increase by 5% each year until the twenty-second year, 
then decrease by 10% each year thereafter. The income during the last ten 
living years is assumed to be one tenth of the peak income. This arbitrary 
assumption on income profile is maintained due to the lack of data. Since the 
income profile is the main identifying variable of the model, inexactly 
predicted income profiles may yield incorrect estimates. A test is performed 
to see the sensitivity of the model by estimating the model with different 
income profiles, in particular, with different assumptions on old-age income. 
The model is estimated separately of each subsample which is divided 
15There were 23, 18 and 15 periods with more than one birth among women in 
primary, high school, and college education group, respectively. In those cases 
the birth is moved to the previous period in which there is no birth. If there 
is no previous period without a birth, then a birth is moved to the next period 
in which there is no birth. 
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according to individual's biological and socio-economic conditions. The idea 
is to make each subsample more homogeneous. To begin, I select women who are 
residing in Seoul and currently not working. 16 The ages at marriage of the 
selected women are between 23 and 26, and current age between 35 and 40. 17 
Due to the lack of information about the deceased children, I selected only 
women whose number of children ever born equals the number of existing 
children. I further select only women with at least one child. 18 
Three subsamples are formed according to woman's education level: 
primary or lower, high school, and college or higher. I estimate the model 
for each group separately. Total periods (women) observed are 1096 (179), 
1198 (200), and 1161 (196) for primary, high-school, and college education 
group respectively. Table la-lb report the averages of the period-specific 
fertility rates, age at the beginning of each fertile period, and monthly 
income in 1000 Korean currency (won) for the whole lifetime. 
(Table 1) 
The fertility rate is highest in the first and second period and then 
decreases rapidly. However, after the third period the rate of decline is 
greater among better educated women than less educated women. Better educated 
women are more likely to stop childbearing early than less educated women even 
16This is imposed due to the problem of computing the wages for the whole 
life cycle for women. It is less problematic for men since they are more likely 
to work without interruption until they retire. 
17For the sample under study the median age at marriage is 25 suggesting 
fertility is complete at age 39, which is true for more than 95% of women in 
Korea; 4.4%, 2.7%, and 2.6% of total births are from women older than 39 in 1970, 
1975, and 1980, respectively (Korean Population and Housing Census). 
18This is imposed to exclude innately sterile women, but this will also 
exclude those who have no children by their intention. However, it is believed 
that there are only very few couples who desire no children. 
12 
after controlling for age. 
Another distinguished feature in observed fertility pattern among the 
sample of Korean women is the differential parity progression rate according 
to the sex composition of existing children. 
(Table 2) 
For example, at parity two, the probability to have another child among women 
whose first two children were girls is twice larger than among those who had 
two boys at their first two births. The similar pattern is present among 
higher parities as well (see Ahn, 1990 for more lengthy discussions). The 
differential parity progression pattern by sex composition of children will 
help identify the model to estimate the sex-specific value of children. 
4. Estimation Results 
Table 3 shows that the value of children varies substantially according to the 
child's gender and age, and the education level of parents. The estimates 
should be interpreted as overall values, non-monetary as well as monetary. 
(Table 3) 
The estimation results can be summarized by several notable aspects. First, 
young children impose net costs while mature children yield net benefits, and 
both costs of young children and benefits from mature children are larger for 
boys than girls. College educated women place greater net value on children 
of age Oto 10 than less educated women do. It is hard to interpret this 
positive net value as an economic one. It then must be the case that the 
non-economic value is dominating the economic costs. However, it is not 
clear why it should not be the case among the less educated women. 
13 
Second, although in all education groups children impose highest costs 
during the age between 11 to 30 and yield net benefits after age 30, they show 
substantial differences according to sex and parental education level. While 
toprimary and high school educated women consider costs of children of age 11 
20 and 21 to 30 about the same, college educated women consider children of 
age 21 to 30 most costly. This is suggestive of variations in expenditure 
plan for children according to parental education level. In particular, the 
substantial difference in net costs at age 21 to 30 between boys and girls 
among college education group might be suggesting the costs of college 
education for boys. 19 
Similarly, the costs of children of age 11 to 30 increase with parental 
education level: the average cost of a son (daughter) is estimated as 11.9 
(14.0), 30.8 (11.0), and 38.1 (29.2) for primary, high school, and college 
20education group. This may reflect the differences in the opportunity cost 
of wife's potential earning power or/and the differencesof a child in terms 
in expenditure (including investment) on children according to parent's 
education level. 
Finally, better educated women expect greater benefits from grown-up 
sons (ages 31 or more) than less educated women do. This difference appears 
to reflect the differential earning power of children due to the different 
19In Korea, college enrollment rate among male has been much larger than 
among female. For example, according to Unesco (1988) the college enrollment 
rates were 23% and 39% among male in 1980 and 1984 respectively, while they were 
8% and 19% among female. Also, Korean men usually have to serve for three years 
in military during their late teens and early twenties. In those cases, the 
college education is taken mostly during one's age of 20' s. In general in Korea, 
the cost of college education is high and is financed by parents. 
20These amounts are 13% (primary education group), 24% (high school), and 
23% (college education group) of average household income during the first 
period. 
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investment received while they were young. The expected benefits from a son 
of age 31 to 50 are 23.6, 34.8, and 67.0 among primary, high school, and 
college educated women, respectively. 21 Contrasting to the substantial 
benefits from grown-up sons, grown-up daughters yield insignificant benefits 
to parents. This might be reflecting the Korean custom that married daughters 
are considered to be outside of the family. 
Overall, the findings suggest that the old-age support from mature sons 
is the important variable in identifying the differential parental fertility 
behavior according to sex-age composition of children. 
I tested whether the value of children is statistically different by 
gender or age. All the three tests (three education groups) reject at 1% 
significance level the null hypothesis that the child costs are the same 
between gender. 22 Also, all tests reject at 1% significance level the null 
hypothesis that the child costs are the same over the four age groups. 23 
4-1. Sensitivity of the Model to the Assumption of Old-Age Income 
Since old-age security appears to play a major role in parents' fertility 
decision-making, I test the sensitivity of the estimates by changing the 
assumption on the old-age income level among the college-educated women (tests 
on other education groups yield similar result). In comparison to the 
21The value of mature sons is about the same as the own old-age income for 
primary or high school group, but a little higher for the college group. 
22Twice the differences of the estimated likelihood with and without 
restriction are 14.24, 13.70 and 26.20, respectively for primary, high school, 
and college education group, and the critical value of Chi-square statistics is 
13.28 at 4 degrees of freedom for 1% significance level. 
23Twice the differences of the estimated likelihood with and without 
restriction are 19.82, 18.44 and 24.48, respectively for primary, high school, 
and college education group, and the critical value of Chi-square statistics is 
16.82 at 6 degrees of freedom for 1% significance level. 
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benchmark case in which old age income is assumed as one-tenth of the peak 
income, new estimates were made assuming the old-age income equal to one-half, 
and one-fifth of the peak income. The results are reported in Table 4. 
(Table 4) 
Since the estimation is based on the same fertility data, one expects 
the estimated benefits from a grown-up child to increase as old age income 
increases. That is, to yield the same observed fertility pattern, the benefit 
from a child during parent's old age should be larger, or/and the costs of 
young children should be smaller when the parent's old age income is greater. 
The empirical results support our conjecture. The net positive value of very 
young children (age Oto 10) and mature children (age 30 or higher) increases, 
as the old-age income increases. 
4-2. Predicted Fertility Profile 
One way of testing maximum likelihood estimation results of a discrete choice 
model is to compare the choices predicted by the estimates with those actually 
made (Table 5, first panel). The fertility rates in the first two periods are 
predicted higher than the actual. Given the slowly rising income schedule 
with reduced income in old age, the optimal strategy is to have births early 
(especially first two periods), and not to have in later periods. The 
prediction of higher fertility in early periods and lower fertility in later 
periods than the actual is due to a rather uniform income profile and the 
perfect fertility controi across individuals, both by assumption, However, 
the predicted pattern and the total rate of fertility match reasonably well 
with the actual ones. 
(Table 5) 
4-3. Income Effect 
16 
Now, given the estimates of the value of children in Table 3, the effect of 
the changes in old-age income on fertility can be predicted. Increases in 
old-age income from one-tenth to one-fifth and one-half of the peak income are 
examined among college educated women (Table 5, second panel). The fertility 
rate in the first two periods does not change much when the old-age income 
increases. The effect appears most prominently in the decrease of fertility 
rate in later periods. As old-age income increases, parents are not so 
desperate to have children to secure old age, even among those who have only 
to 2.06 and to 1.46,girls. The expected fertility rate decreases from 2.56 
as the old-age income increases to one-fifth and to one-half of the peak 
income respectively. 
4-4. Effect of the Changing Value of Children 
Given that one of the main interests of the paper is to infer the type and 
intensity of the parental sex preference due to the differential value of 
children between boys and girls, it is interesting to predict the effect of 
the changes in value of children on fertility. Three different types of value 
of children are used for the simulation (Table 5, third panel). 
First, if daughters have the same value as estimated for sons from table 
3, the optimal fertility rate might increase due to the rise in the marginal 
value of children. On the other hand, it may also decrease since any child 
will provide support when parents are old, so that parents even with only 
girls do not have to go on having children to provide themselves with security 
in old age. The overall effect on fertility rate is ambiguous. The predicted 
fertility rate is higher early in life cycle and lower later than in the 
same at 2.56.benchmark case. However, the total fertility rate is about the 
In the opposite case (that is, sons have the same value as estimated for 
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daughters), the fertility rate would be zero due to the negative values for 
any child of any age. 
Finally, if a child of either sex has the value profile which is the 
average of the estimated value of boys and girls, the fertility rate increases 
slightly, from 2.56 to 2.64. This is due to the small costs and benefits of 
small, parentschildren. That is, as the benefits from mature children are 
need many children to secure some old age consumption. Moreover, the costs of 
young children is small relative to income so that parents can afford to have 
many children. This might be interpreted as higher demand for less risky 
investment. 
s. Selective Abortion, Fertility and sex Ratio 
The modern technology which gives parents the ability to determine the gender 
of a fetus has added a new dimension to the problem of fertility choice 
(Bennett and Mason 1983; Bloom and Grenier 1983; Kobrin and Potter, Jr. 1983). 
For parents who prefer to have children of one sex to the other, this ability 
may lead to selective abortion. An immediate consequence may be a change in 
the sex ratio at birth, and eventually throughout the population if selective 
abortion is practiced broadly over a prolonged period. 
One notable case is in Korea. According to the report of 1990 Korean 
Vital Statistics, during the 1980s the male-female birth ratio in Korea has 
increased dramatically, especially at high birth orders (Table 6). For 
example, in 1989, among the children born of the third or higher birth order, 
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the male-female sex ratio approaches almost two24 when it is normally less 
than 1.1 males to 1.0 female. The sex ratio might increase further in the 
future if many parents want only one or two children, but of a specific sex. 
(Table 6) 
It is likely from the estimates in Table 3 that unless the costs of 
screening test or abortion are high this sample of Korean women would have 
only boys. However, as shown in Table 6, the selective abortions are prac­
ticed mostly at high birth orders. In general, parents seem to leave the sex 
of the first two children to chance. Only those who were "unlucky" in their 
first two births are practicing selective abortion. This might be due to the 
high costs of the screening test or abortion relative to incomes or only a 
small gain from the selective abortion during the first couple of pregnancies. 
A good prediction of the effect of the selective abortion through a screening 
test will depend on the good measure of its costs, and of course on the 
accurate measurement of the value of children. 
Using the estimated values of children from Table 3, we can simulate the 
effect of alternative test costs on conception, screening test, selective 
abortion, and consequently on the sex ratio of children. The estimated 
proportion who choose to conceive, and, among those, who take the screening 
test at each fertile period are presented in Table 7. If the test cost is 50 
(in 1000 won per month during the period), no conception is tested for its 
gender during the first two periods. But at the third and fourth period, 44% 
24Infanticide or discriminatory child care which leads to differential 
mortality rate between male and female children would also cause the biased sex 
ratio. In the context of Korea these cases are believed to be trivial compared 
to the case of selective abortion. See Hull (1989) and Johansson and Nygren 
(1991) for the discussions of Chinese case. 
19 
and 88% of conceptions are tested. As the price of the test decreases to 30, 
3% of women take the test at the first period, while the percentage goes up to 
about 88% at the second period and 100% at the third or later periods. In 
later periods, however, only few women choose to conceive.If the test costs 
nothing, most of women who choose to conceive take the test at all periods. 
The time pattern of using the test mostly depends on the costs of the 
test relative to income, given the value of children. If the cost of test is 
high relative to income during the early periods, people are better off by 
delaying the test to later periods when the income is high. 
(Table 7) 
The figures on the number of conceptions, number of live births, and the 
sex ratio for alternative test costs are also computed (Table 7). It is 
assumed that the probability of any conception to be a boy is 0.515, that the 
test is perfectly accurate, and that female fetuses, if tested, are aborted. 
As the test cost becomes cheaper, the number of live birth decreases, while 
the number of conceptions goes up. Consequently, the sex ratio among children 
becomes larger with the decrease of the test cost. The male-female birth 
ratio rises to 2.91 from 1.33 as the test cost decreases from 50 to 30. 
How realistic are these simulation results? Using the data for Seoul 
reported in Korean Vital Statistics (1982-1989) which provides number of 
births by sex at each birth order, the proportions who took the screening test 
during pregnancy are computed. The sex ratio among the first births is used 
as a natural sex ratio for any birth order, and it is assumed that female 
fetuses are aborted if the test is taken. 25 Table 8 indicates that an in-
25Under these assumptions the use of screening test is likely to be 
underestimated due to several reasons. First, some parents might take test to 
abort male fetuses. Second, it is not likely that all pregnancies which are 
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creasing proportions are taking the screening test over time, first among high 
birth orders, then gradually among lower birth orders. During 1989, in Seoul, 
5% of the second births, 46% of the third, 60% of the fourth, 44% of the 
fifth, and 93% of the sixth births resorted to prenatal gender tests. The 
proportion of pregnant women who take the screening test (consequently the sex 
ratio) is likely to go up further in the future, in particular among low birth 




This paper estimates the value of children by gender and age using a dynamic 
programming model. The underlying hypothesis is that the observed fertility 
outcomes for any couple are the solutions to their life cycle optimization 
problem. The model is estimated using 1980 Korean Population Census. 
The empirical findings in this research indicate that parental valuation 
of children varies according to child's gender and age, and own education 
levels. Although at young ages boys impose relatively higher costs, they are 
preferred to girls because of greater expected support in old age. Further­
more, the analysis suggests that the better educated women not only expect 
higher cost of rearing young children but also anticipate higher benefits from 
them when grown, than less educated women. Overall, the old-age support from 
mature sons appears to be the most important influencing factor in parental 
tested to be of the unwanted sex are aborted. Third, there might be selective 
abortions performed to the first births. 
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decisions on fertility choices. Simulations show that, as income increases in 
old age, parents would not be so desperate to have children, even among those 
who have only girls. 
As the estimation results suggest, the son preference in Korea is still 
strong. Therefore, selective abortions subsequent to fetal screening tests 
which have become widely available in recent years bring in a new aspect to 
the problem of fertility choices. Simulations suggest that sex ratio would 
increase further in future, if the costs of screening tests and abortion 
decrease. The dramatic increase of male-birth ratio in Korea during the late 
1980's provides evidence of this development. 
How will sex ratio change in future? Will the perceived value of boys 
relative to girls change as sex ratios change? What will be the effects of 
the changes in income, education, and other socio-economic aspects of the 
environment on sex ratios? How effective will be legal or institutional 
regulations on prescreening test or gender selective abortions? This is an 
agenda for future research. The fertility choice model should include the 
availability of the selective abortion with an appropriate measure of price. 
REFERENCES 
Ahn, N. 1990. "Sequential Family Formation When the Children's Sex Matter." 
Unpublished manuscript. Yale University. 
Arnold, F., R.A. Bulatao, C. Buripaledi, B.J. Chung, J.T. Fawcett, T. Iritani, 
S.J. Lee, and T.S. Wu. 1975. The Value of Children: A Cross-National 
22 
Study. Vol. 1, Introduction and Comparative Analysis. Honolulu: 
East-West Population Institute. 
Becker, G.S., and H.G. Lewis. 1973. "On the Interaction between the Quantity 
and Quality of Children." Journal of Political Economy 81: S279-288. 
Becker, G.S., and N. Tomes. 1976. "Child Endowments and the Quantity and 
Quality of Children." Journal of Political Economy 84: S143-162. 
Behrman, J.R., R. Pollak, and P. Taubman. 1982. "Parental Preferences and 
Provision for Progeny." Journal of Political Economy 90(1): 52-73. 
Behrman, J.R., R. Pollak, and P. Taubman. 1986. "Do parents favor boys?" 
International Economic Review 27(1): 33-54. 
Bennett, N.E. and A. Mason. 1983. "Decision Making and Sex Selection with 
Biased Technologies." Pp. 101-112 in Sex Selection, ed. by N.G. Bennett. 
New York: Academic Press. 
Bloom, D.E. and G. Grenier. 1983. "The Economics of Sex Preference and Sex 
Selection." Pp. 113-128 in Sex Selection, ed. by N.G. Bennett. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Bulatao, R.A. 1981. "Values and disvalues of children in successive 
childbearing decision." Demography 18(1): 1-25. 
Cain, M. 1977. "The Economic Activities of Children in a Village in 
Bangladesh." Population and Development Review 3: 201-227. 
Cain, M. 1981. "Risk and Insurance: Perspectives on Fertility and Agrarian 
Change in India and Bangladesh." Population and Development Review 7: 
435-474. 
Caldwell, J.C. 1982. Theory of Fertility Decline. London: Academic Press. 
Caldwell, J.C. 1983. "Direct Economic Costs and Benefits of Children." Pp. 
453-493 in Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries, Vol. 1: 
Supply and Demand for Children, ed. by Bulatao and Lee. New York: 
Academic Press. 
David, P., and T. Mroz. 1989. "Evidence of Fertility Regulation among Rural 
French Villagers, 1749-1789: A Sequential Econometric Model of 
Birth-Spacing Behavior among Rural French Villagers, 1749-1789." 
European Journal of Population 5(1): 1-26; 5(2): 173-206. 
Espenshade, T.J. 1984. Investing in Children: New Estimates of Parental 
Expenditure. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press. 
Fawcett, J.T. 1983. "Perceptions of the Value of Children: Satisfaction and 
Costs." Pp. 429-457 in Determinants of Fertility in Developing 
Countries, Vol. 1: Supply and Demand for Children, ed. by Bulatao and 
Lee. New York: Academic Press. 
23 
Heckman, J.J., and R.J. Willis. 1976. "Estimation of a Stochastic Model of 
Reproduction: An Econometric Approach." Pp. 99-145 in Household 
Production and Consumption, ed. by N. Terleckyj. New York: Columbia 
University. 
Hotz, J., and R. Miller. 1988. "An Empirical Analysis of Life Cycle Fertility 
and Female Labor Supply. 11 Econometrica 56: 91-118. 
Hull, T.H. 1990. "Recent Trends in Sex Ratios at Birth in China." Population 
and Development Review 16(1): 63-83. 
Johansson, S. and 0. Nygren. 1991. "The Missing Girls of China: A New 
Demographic Account." Population and Development Review 17(1): 35-51. 
Kobrin, F.E. and R.G. Potter, Jr. 1983. "Sex Selection through Amniocentesis 
and Selective Abortion." Pp. 47-71 in Sex Selection ed. by N.G. Bennett. 
New York: Academic Press. 
Lindert, P.H. 1978. Fertility and Scarcity in America. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Lindert, P.H. 1980. "Child Costs and Economic Development." Pp. 3-79 in 
Population and Economic Change in Developing Countries, ed. by R.A. 
Easterlin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Moffitt, R. 1984. "Profiles of Fertility, Labor Supply and Wages of Married 
Women: A Complete Life-Cycle Model." Review of Economic Studies 51: 
263-278. 
Montgomery, M. 1988. "A Dynamic Model of Contraceptive Choice." Office of 
Population Research, Princeton University. 
Mueller, E. 1976. "The Economic Value of Children in Peasant Agriculture." Pp. 
98-153 in Population Development: A Search for Selective Interventions, 
ed. by R. Ridker. Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Nag. M., B. White and R.C. Peet. 1978. "An Anthropological Approach to the 
Study of the Economic Value of Children in Java and Nepal." Current 
Anthropology 419: 293-306. 
National Bureau of Statistics (Korea). 1990. Annual Report on the Vital 
Statistics. Seoul: National Bureau of Statistics. 
Newman, J. 1988. "A Stochastic Dynamic Model of Fertility." Research in 
Population Economics 6: 41-68. 
Robinson, W.C. 1987. "The Time Cost of Children and Other Household 
Production." Population Studies 41(2): 313-323. 
Rosenzweig, M., and T.P. Schultz. 1982. "Market Opportunities, Genetic 
Endowments, and Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in 
Rural India." American Economic Review 72: 803-815. 
24 
Rosenzweig, M., and T.P. Schultz. 1985. "The Demand and Supply of Births." 
American Economic Review 75: 992-1015. 
Rust, J. 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model 
of Harold Zurcher." Econometrica 55: 999-1033. 
Rust, J. 1989. "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Discrete Control Process 
es." SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 26(5): 1-19. 
Unesco. 1988. Statistical YearBook, 1988. Unesco. 
Vlassoff, C. 1990. "The Value of Sons in an India Village: How Widow see it." 
Population Studies 44(1): 5-20. 
Willis, R.J. 1973. "A New Approach to the Economic Theory of Fertility 
Behavior." Journal of Political Economy 81(2): S14-64. 
'Wolpin, K. 1984. "An Estimable Dynamic Stochastic Model of Fertility and Child 
Mortality." Journal of Political Economy 92: 852-874. 
25 
Table la: Period Fertility Rate and Average Age 
Perioda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(i) Primary or lower 
Fertility 0.84 0.75 0.56 0.38 0.21 0.05 0.04 
Avg. Ageb 24.5 26.5 28.5 30.5 32.4 34.4 36.3 
NC 179 179 179 179 170 135 75 
(ii) High school 
Fertility 0. 78 0.81 0.54 0.36 0.12 0.08 0.05 
Avg. Age 24.3 26.3 28.3 30.3 32.3 34.2 36.0 
N 200 200 200 200 193 145 78 
(iii) College 
Fertility 0.82 0.81 0.60 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.03 
Avg. Age 24.7 26.7 28.7 30.7 32.7 34.7 36.6 




two year period since marriage. 
at the start of the period. 
the number of women. 
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Table lb: Income Profile (monthly income in 1000 won) 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Primary 95.95 104.68 115.41 127.24 140.28 154.66 170.51 
(std. dev.) 36.16 39.87 43.96 48.46 53.43 58.90 64.94 
High School 128.84 142.05 156.62 172.67 190.37 209.88 231.39 
(std. dev.) 49.17 54.20 59.76 65.89 72.64 80.08 88.29 
College 166.16 183.19 201.97 222.67 245.50 270.66 298.40 
(std. dev) 44.54 49.10 54.14 59.69 65.80 72.55 79.99 
Period 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Primary 187.99 207.25 228.50 251.92 217.62 187.99 162.39 
(std. dev.) 71.60 78.94 87.03 95.95 82.89 71.60 61.85 
High School 255.11 281.25 310.09 341.87 295.32 255.11 220.37 
(std. dev.) 97.34 107.32 118.32 130.45 112.69 97.34 84.09 
College 328.99 362.71 399.89 440.88 380.84 328.99 284.19 
(std. dev) 88.18 97.22 107.18 118.17 102.08 88.18 76.18 
Period 15 16 17 18 19 20 21-25 
Primary 140.28 121.18 104.68 90.42 78.11 67.48 25.19 
(std. dev) 53.43 46.15 39.87 34.44 29.75 25.70 9.60 
High School 190.37 164.45 142.05 122.71 106.00 91.57 34.19 
(std. dev.) 72.64 62.75 54.20 46.82 40.45 34.94 13.04 
College 245.50 212.07 183.19 158.25 136.70 118.09 44.09 
(std. dev.) 65.80 56.84 49.10 42.42 36.64 31.65 11.82 
Note: Monthly income is computed by matching the husband's age and occupation 
in Census to the average male income by age and occupation reported in 
Monthly Wage Survey (1980, Korean Department of Labor). 
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Table 2: Parity Progression Rate (%) 
by Sex Composition 
Number of boys among existing children 
Progression 0 1 2 3 4 
1 to 2+ 96.4 94.1 
(386) (506) 
2 to 3+ 87.7 55.1 43.9 
(179) (439) (230) 
3 to 4+ 54.4 31. 2 7.8 22.0 
(79) (176) (204) (41) 
4 to 5+ 40.0 9.3 0.0 9.1 20.0 
(25) (43) (39) (11) (5) 
Note: Sample sizes in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Estimated Monthly Net Value of Boys and Girls 
(in 1000 won) 
Woman's com2leted education level 
Parameter Primary High School College 





























Girl's net value b:£ age 
Age 0-10 -0.26 ( 0.25) 
Age 11-20 -13. 59 ( 2. 67) 
Age 21-30 -14.40 ( 5.38) 





















periods observed 1096 1198 1161 
Note: Unsigned asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity of the Estimates to Changes in 
the Assumption on Old-Age Income 
(College Educated Women) 
Old-age income as a ratio to peak income 
Parameter One-half 
Boy's net value by age 
Age 0-10 26.60 ( 0.01) 
Age 11-20 -32.93 ( 5.67) 
Age 21-30 -72.30 ( 7.06) 
Age 31-50 99.79 ( 6.49) 
Girl's net value by age 
Age 0-10 32.32 ( 0.25) 
Age 11-20 -26.10 ( 2.67) 
Age 21-30 -14.98 ( 5.58) 
Age 31-50 12.60 ( 0.19) 
Log-Likelihood -700.99 
Note: Unsigned asymptotic t-statistics are 
One-fifth 
16.80 ( 3.21) 
-17.01 ( 7.20) 
-63.43 (35.35) 
70.44 (17.22) 
17.82 ( 3.65) 
-26.64 (10.82) 
-27.79 (17.65) 




10.48 ( 5.76) 
-13.09 ( 5.10) 
-63.02 (25.78) 
67.04 (27.78) 
10.82 ( 5.86) 
-26.99 (19.95) 
-31. 33 (13. 31) 
3.13 ( 1.59) 
-684.54 
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Table 5: Predicted Fertility Rate 
(College Educated Women) 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Actual 0.82 0.81 0.60 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.03 2.60 
Predicted 1.00 0.86 0.42 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.00 2.56 
Income effect 
One-fiftha 1.00 0. 72 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.06 
One-halfb 0.98 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 
Effect of changes in value of children 
Equal 0 0.00 0.93 0.41 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.00 2.56 
Averaged 1.00 0.95 0.53 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.00 2.64 
N 196 196 196 196 187 132 58 
a. Old-age income increases to one-fifth of the peak income. 
b. Old-age income increases to one-half of the peak income. 
C • Value of girls is set as the same as the estimated value of boys. 
d. Value of a child of either sex is set as the average of the estimated value 
of boys and girls. 
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Table 6: Male-Female Birth Ratios by Birth Order in Korea 
Birth order 
Year Total 1 2 3 4 5+ 
1989 1.13 1.05 1.14 1. 90 2.17 2.14 
(613240) (328044) (241249) (34794) (6551) (2605) 
1988 1.14 1.08 1.14 1. 70 1. 99 1. 87 
(620316) (335449) (238279) (35880) (7402) (3306) 
1987 1.09 1.05 1.09 1. 37 1.50 1. 63 
(613556) (333111) (230097) (37523) (8474) (4351) 
1986 1.13 1.08 1.12 1.43 1. 61 1. 61 
(613703) (325517) (229794) (42294) (10406) (5685) 
1985 1.10 1.06 1.08 1.33 1. 57 1. 54 
(636621) (328212) (241201) (47228) (12778) (7191) 
1984 1.09 1.07 1.08 1.19 1. 32 1. 34 
(660234) (326720) (250939) (55585) (17188) (9793) 
1983 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.13 1. 21 1.28 
(757930) (339091) (291298) (84508) (27225) (15801) 
1982 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.10 1.13 1.18 
(840279) (351335) (299408) (124383) (40708) (24442) 
1981 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.13 1.15 
(864958) (354298) (290228) (142096) (47913) (30347) 
1980 1.04 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.02 0.96 
(888355) (351213) (278814) (149015) (59370) (49859) 
Note: Number of births are in parentheses. 
Data: Annual report on the Vital Statistics (1990), National Bureau of 
Statistics, Economic Planning Board of Korea. 
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Table 7: Predicted Proportion of Conception (D) and Screening Test 
with Various Costs of Screening Test 




test 1 2 
Period 
























































2.65 2.39 1. 33 








average number of pregnancy. 
children ever born. 
male-female chid ratio among children born. 
the proportion who choose to conceive. 
the proportion, among those who choose to conceive, who choose 
the test. 
there are very few who choose to conceive at periods 6 and 7. 
to take 
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Table 8: Estimated Ratio(%) of Screening Test by Birth Order 
Calculated Using Data from Vital Statistics 
SEOUL 
Birth order 
Year Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 


































































































Number of births are in parentheses. 
Annual report on the Vital Statistics (1990), 
Statistics, Economic Planning Board of Korea. 
National Bureau of 
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